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SOCIAL JUSTICE AND SOCIAL MEDIA: RESPONDING TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF JUSTICE BY THE 
INTERNET COMMUNITY 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE ENFORCEMENT OF JUSTICE BY THE INTERNET COMMUNITY 
 
 The internet has reshaped how the community participates in the work of enforcing 
justice. The community has always played an important role in enforcing social norms through 
tools such as shaming and ostracization. In the past, norm enforcement by the community played 
a primary role in sanctioning deviant behavior and maintaining social order. Even after the 
formal legal system took control of criminal punishment, the community continued to play an 
important role. As communities grew larger and diversified, the role of the community in 
punishing deviant behavior decreased. Recently, however, the advent of the internet and social 
media has allowed community norm enforcement to again have a central role in enforcing justice 
by both expanding the tools of enforcement available to the community and increasing the 
effectiveness of these tools. 
 Scholars and journalists have given this enhanced community norm enforcement a 
number of labels—online shaming,1 digital vigilantism,2 or internet outrage.3 None of these 
definitions, however, fully capture the unique nature of this phenomenon. These scenarios often 
begin with shaming, but they lead to and incorporate tangible consequences, such as the loss of a 
job or even death threats that necessitate relocation. In addition, the entire community is involved 
in the norm enforcement, so “vigilantism” is an improper label. Finally, “internet outrage” 
partially describes the phenomenon but does not take into account how the outrage is directed 
toward a specific individual to condemn a discrete action. Because this behavior is a community 
endeavor with the purpose of reinforcing norms and punishing unethical behavior, this Note 
refers to the phenomenon as “the enforcement of justice by the internet community,” abbreviated 
“internet justice.” 
 Internet justice is unique from other, harmful online behaviors, such as internet 
harassment
4
 or cyber bullying.
5
 While internet justice uses some of the same tools as cyber 
harassment and bullying, internet justice has several distinguishing characteristics. First, internet 
                                                 
1
 JON RONSON, SO YOU’VE BEEN PUBLICLY SHAMED 292-94 (2015).  
2
 Bianca Bosker, Why We Should All Fear the Righteous Online Mob, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 27, 2013, 1:29 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/27/justin-sacco-online-vigilantism_n_4505452.html; Bronwen Clune, 
Digital Vigilantism: Think Before Putting Pictures of 'Wrongdoing' Online, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 28, 2013, 7:22 
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/29/digital-vigilantism-think-before-pictures-of-
wrongdoing-online.  
3
 Spencer Kornhaber, Ending the Internet Outrage Cycle, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2015/04/so-youve-been-publicly-shamed-trevor-noah-and-why-
everyone-needs-to-quiet-down-about-everything/389360/. 
4
 Cyber harassment includes acts such as “trolling” and “revenge porn.” Trolling targets vulnerable populations such 
as women, racial minorities, or homosexuals and involves the posting of hateful or violent messages directed at 
individuals in these groups. See Joel Stein, How Trolls Are Ruining the Internet, TIME (Aug. 18, 2016), 
http://time.com/4457110/internet-trolls/. Revenge porn involves the posting online of sexual explicitly photos of a 
former intimate partner in order to humiliate him or her. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Revenge Porn, State Law, and Free 
Speech, 48 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 57, 63-64 (2014).    
5
 Cyberbullying involves the use of social media to humiliate classmates in a variety of ways. See State 
Cyberstalking, Cyberharassment and Cyberbullying Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://ssl.csg.org/dockets/2012cycle/32B/32Bdocmins/Cyberstalking,%20Cyberharassment%20and%20Cyberbullyi
ng%20Laws.pdf (last updated Dec. 20, 2010) (providing definitions of cyberstalking, cyberharassment, and 
cyberbullying).   
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justice typically focuses on issues currently in the social justice spotlight, such as sexism, racism, 
rape, or animal cruelty.
6
 Second, where perpetrators of cyber harassment or bullying typically 
target those in positions of vulnerability, internet justice targets individuals in perceived 
positions of privilege.
7
 Finally, while acts of cyber harassment or bullying are usually 
condemned by the larger community, acts of internet justice are typically accepted or lauded as 
justified.
8
 
 While negative internet behaviors such as cyber harassment raise difficult legal questions 
of how to best punish the behavior without violating the First Amendment, most in the legal 
community would agree that cyber harassment is negative and should be punished to the extent 
possible. With internet justice, however, the discussion is not so simple. Community norm 
enforcement, although secondary to the judicial system in sanctioning deviant behavior, plays an 
important role in society, a role that the judicial system cannot fill. Because it does not have the 
checks and balances of the judicial system, however, community norm enforcement can apply 
sanctions that are overly harsh or undeserved entirely. Internet justice, community norm 
enforcement as evolved in the internet age, reflects in amplified form both the positive and 
negative aspects of community norm enforcement.  
 This Note formulates a suggested response to internet justice by the legal community. 
First, this Note explores the positive aspects of internet justice, arguing that it has significant 
value in supplementing the judicial system in the pursuit of a just society. Second, this Note also 
proposes a solution to the need to regulate the negative aspects of internet justice without unduly 
impeding the positive role that it plays. This solution will require drawing a theoretical line 
where an instance of internet justice shifts from beneficial to dangerous, which this Note argues 
is when the shaming begins to resemble cyberstalking, which places the target of the shaming in 
physical danger. Having identified this line, the next step should be crafting a regulatory 
framework requiring internet service providers to remove certain posted content that places 
individuals targeted by shaming in danger. Before exploring such a solution, however, an 
understanding of the role that norm enforcement plays in society is necessary. 
 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COMMUNITY NORM ENFORCEMENT 
 
 Law is not the only force that governs the actions of individuals. Communities also 
regulate the actions of community members by enforcing norms through informal sanctions. In 
his field-defining work Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes, Robert C. Ellickson 
defines norms as standards of behavior that are both descriptive and prescriptive; that is, norms 
are behavior patterns that people normally follow and that most people ought to adhere to.
9
 
When individuals violate these norms, the community applies sanctions to correct the behavior.
10
 
Similarly, the community applies rewards to encourage behavior that complies with the norms.
11
 
                                                 
6
 See infra Part II. 
7
 See id.  
8
 See id. 
9
 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 126 (1994). 
10
 Id. at 124-26. 
11
 Id. Ellickson defines rewards as “goods, services, or obligations that a person would assign a positive monetary 
value.” Id. at 124. Conversely, “punishments are goods, services, obligations that a person would pay to be rid of.” 
Id. 
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Ellickson recognizes five “controllers” that enforce sanctions to govern behavior. First, 
individuals self-regulate their own behavior according to personal ethics.
12
 Second, parties to a 
contract regulate behavior by applying rewards (reciprocating goods or services) or punishments 
(not reciprocating) in order to compel the other party’s performance of the contract terms.13 
Third, nongovernmental organizations apply organizational rules to govern behavior of 
organization members.
14
 Fourth, governmental actors apply legal sanctions to compel obedience 
to the law.
15
 Finally, the community as a whole, which Ellickson labels “social forces,” enforces 
norms by means of informal methods of control.
16
 
These community norm enforcement sanctions can be incredibly powerful. In Conditions 
of Successful Degradation of Ceremonies, sociologist Harold Garfinkel describes the effect of 
the most severe type of sanction—the public denunciation.17 Garfinkel describes the successful 
public denunciation as resulting in a complete destruction and recreation of the offender’s 
identity.
18
 The offender is transformed from someone fundamentally alike to the rest of the 
society’s members to someone who is in essence an offender, i.e. a “murderer,” “liar,” or 
“traitor.”19 
In the past, and presently in some areas of the world, tribal communities have used 
informal, shame-based methods of norm enforcement as the main means of regulating the 
behavior of community members.
20
 In colonial America, where communities were small and 
intimate, the formal justice system used similar shame-based sanctions as the main method of 
justice enforcement for much of America’s early history.21 As society expanded and diversified, 
shame-based sanctions became less effective.
22
 As a result, the justice system largely abandoned 
shame-based sanctions in favor of incarceration, although some judges have experimented with 
shaming sanctions in recent years.
23
 Today, however, the internet has again created a community 
where informal norm enforcement can effectively conscript behavior on a large scale.  
 
A. Norm Enforcement Amongst Tribal Communities 
 
 Although all cultures use informal community norm enforcement on some level, some 
tribal communities have relied upon informal shame-based sanctions as the primary method of 
maintaining group order.
24
 For example, anthropologists living among Inuit tribes in the early 
20th century noted that the tribal members relied upon “song duels” to resolve conflicts between 
community members.
25
 If one community member accused another of wrongdoing, that wronged 
community member would publicly challenge the alleged wrongdoer and, through a chant, 
                                                 
12
 Id. at 131. 
13
 Id. 
14
 Id. 
15
 Id. 
16
 Id. 
17
 Harold Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J. SOC. 420 (1956). 
18
 Id. at 421.  
19
 Id. at 421-22. 
20
 See infra Subsection I.A. 
21
 See infra Subsection I.B. 
22
 See infra Subsection I.C. 
23
 See id. 
24
 See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1991-12 (1991). 
25
 Id. at 1991.  
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would seek to shame him or her.
26
 Through the chant, the accuser would list the alleged 
wrongdoer’s offenses before the community.27 In this way, the tribes were able to resolve 
conflicts and maintain social order without the use of formal legal process.
28
  
 
B. The Use of Community Shame-Based Sanctions in Colonial America 
 
 In colonial America, local communities used similar shame-based sanctions via both the 
formal legal system and informal methods as the primary means of punishing wrong behavior 
and regulating group conduct.
29
 The formal legal system used a variety of shaming techniques 
ranging from coerced public repentance to physically and emotionally severe public 
humiliation.
30
 On one end of the spectrum, the local government officials would use an 
“admonition,” which would involve a public recitation of the wrongdoer’s offenses, followed by 
an opportunity for the offender to confess and seek the community’s forgiveness.31 More severe 
shaming punishments included the stocks and the pillory, where the offender would be displayed 
and humiliated in a public location and potentially subjected to whipping as well.
32
 The most 
severe shame punishment inflicted was banishment, devastating because of both the emotional 
weight of total rejection by the community and the practical difficulty of building a new life in 
another community.
33
 
 Colonial communities, primarily through the church, would also utilize shame-based 
norm enforcement outside of the legal system. Puritanism shaped colonial society in many ways, 
particularly how communities would enforce norms.
34
 At an early age, parents would use harsh 
disciple and the doctrine of original sin to teach children to view all willfulness and rebellion as 
manifestations of sin.
35
 As a result, community members were raised with a high sensitivity to 
shame.
36
 Thus, church communities could effectively sanction behavior through practices such 
as forced confession and repentance before the congregation.
37
 In this way, communities could 
enforce norms through not only formal, legal means, but also through extra-legal, community-
based methods. 
 
                                                 
26
 Id. 
27
 Id.  
28
 Id. (“Using these song duels, the Eskimos sought to preserve the social order without violence or other formal 
coercion.”).  
29
 Ryan K. Williams, Shaming and Shunning, in THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: AN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 1657 (Wilber R. Miller, ed. 2012). 
30
 Id. at 1657-59 (describing the various shaming punishments used by the colonist communities). 
31
 See Massaro, supra note 24, at 1912.  
32
 See Williams, supra note 29, at 1658-59. 
33
 See id. 
34
 See Massaro, supra note 24, at 1914 (“Puritan culture, especially the belief in the doctrine of predestination, may 
help to explain the seemingly unfeeling tone, and the specific methods, of Puritan punishment”); see also Adam J. 
Hirsch, From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceration in Early Massachusetts, 80 MICH. L. REV. 
1179, 1221-23 (1982) (describing the effects of puritanism on the colonial approach to crime). 
35
 See Massaro, supra note 24, at 1915. 
36
 See id. 
37
 See id. at 1913 (“The offender often was forced to confess publicly to her congregation, sometimes dressed in a 
white cloth, and beg their forgiveness. This forgiveness, or redemption, effectively drew the offender back into the 
fold and further reinforced the moral order.”).  
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C. Moving Away from Shame-Based Sanctions  
 
 In both tribal communities and in colonial American, similar factors allowed for the 
success of shame-based and community-based sanctions in regulating group behavior. The 
primary factor in both cases was the small size of these communities.
38
 Colonial communities 
most often had less than two thousand inhabitants.
39
 This small size resulted in communities 
where most inhabitants knew each other and would experience great shame if disgraced publicly 
before other community members.
40
 
 Several other factors, however, also facilitated the success of shame-based punishments. 
For example, in tribal and colonial communities, inhabitants relied heavily upon each other, so 
sanctions that resulted in reintegration into society, as opposed to removal from society through 
incarnation, were preferable.
41
 In addition, because of this mutual interdependence, community 
members had incentive to be involved in the lives of others in the community instead of 
remaining distant and uninvolved.
42
 Community members also could not easily leave their 
community and move to a new community to escape the pain of a shaming. Finally, colonial 
communities in particular had a clearly defined set of shared moral beliefs that allowed 
communities to apply shame-based punishments that would be widely effective.
43
  
 As societies grew and diversified, these factors faded, which resulted in the decreasing 
effectiveness of both informal and formal shame-based social control. Communities grew in size, 
and transitions between communities become much more common.
44
 Industrialization decreased 
the need for reliance on fellow community members. Because of this breakdown in community 
cohesion, shame sanctions no longer carried the same weight, either of emotional pain or 
practical effect.
45
  
 Crime rates spiked as previously standard shame-based sanctions lost their 
effectiveness.
46
 As a result, during this time period, the formal legal system turned to 
incarceration as the standard sanction for wrong behavior.
47
 Today, although some judges have 
experimented with shame-based sanctions in recent years,
48
 incarceration remains the main tool 
of punishment used by the formal legal system. In recent years, however, with the rise of social 
media, the internet has opened the door for effective social control through informal means of 
community norm enforcement.
49
 
                                                 
38
 See id. at 1916; Hirsch, supra note 34, at 1223. 
39
 Hirsch, supra note 34, at 1223. 
40
 Massaro, supra note 24, at 1912 (“Moreover, the social intimacy of colonial communities meant that criminal 
offenders typically were known members of the group, not transient outsiders. Thus, the fear of disgrace before the 
community was considerable.”). 
41
 See id. at 1916 (“If [the community member] must depend greatly on the group for social, economic, or political 
support, or cannot leave the group easily, then a social sanction will have a tremendous impact.”). 
42
 See id.  
43
 See id. (“These cultures have widely shared moral or behavior expectations of their citizens, which are public.”); 
see also supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. 
44
 See Hirsch, supra note 34, at 1223, 1228 (“As late as 1690, no town in Massachusetts, save Boston and Salem, 
held more than 2,000 persons. . . . By 1765, some thirty towns contained more than 2,000 residents apiece, and 
almost half of all towns within the province had swelled beyond the 1,000 person mark.”).  
45
 See id. at 1229-32. 
46
 Id. at 1229-31. 
47
 See id. at 1234-42. 
48
 See Massaro, supra note 24, at 1884-90 (describing recent examples of modern shaming punishments). 
49
 See infra Section I.D. 
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D. The Reemergence of Community Norm Enforcement with the Internet 
 
 The internet has created an online community with characteristics that allow for the 
effective use of informal shame-based norm enforcement.
50
 Social media is a public forum where 
a perceived offender can be brought before the community and shamed. Like in the colonial 
communities, leaving the community to escape the pain of the shame punishment is difficult, if 
not impossible. While an individual can leave the social media forum, the shaming will continue 
in the individual’s absence and affect the individual’s friends, family, and co-workers.  
 In addition to bearing similarities to colonial and tribal communities that allowed for the 
effectiveness of shaming sanctions, the social media community also has differences that both 
increase the effectiveness of shaming penalties and remove safeguards present in colonial and 
tribal communities. The social media community can enforce penalties that are more severe than 
those used in colonial times because of the size of the community and the permanence of the 
shaming. In tribal and colonial times, the small size of the communities increased the 
effectiveness of shamings.
51
 Because the internet creates a forum visible by millions 
simultaneously, however, the immense size of the social media community only intensifies the 
severity of a shaming, as opposed to detracting from it.  
 Because everything on the internet is preserved permanently, the effects of a shamings 
also have the potential to last much longer than in colonial times.
52
 In colonial times, the 
shaming would end when the individual was removed from the stocks and released. On social 
media, however, the shaming can continue indefinitely, as a google search of the shamed 
individual’s name can bring back the same Tweets, photos, and news articles that resulted from 
the shaming.
53
 Shamings on the internet, then, have the potential to reach a larger audience and 
to last much longer than punishments inflicted in colonial times.  
 Not only are the penalties potentially more severe, however, but social media shamings 
also lack the restraints, both legal and societal, that tempered shaming sanctions in the past. 
Societally, shamings in colonial times were restrained by the mutual interdependence of 
community members and the resulting need to reintegrate offenders back into the community.
54
 
                                                 
50
 See Jon Ronson, SO YOU’VE BEEN PUBLICLY SHAMED (2015) (“We have always had some influence over the 
justice system, but for the first time in 180 years—since the stocks and pillory were outlawed—we have the power 
to determine the severity of some punishment.”); see also Lauren M. Goldman, Trending Now: The Use of Social 
Media Websites in Public Shaming Punishments, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 415 (2015) (“It appears that an offender’s 
community via online social media platforms contains the cultural conditions that existed during the colonial period, 
which fostered an environment in which public shaming thrived.”).  
51
 See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
52
 See Cole Stryker, The Problem with Public Shaming, THE NATION (Apr. 24, 2013), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/problem-public-shaming/ (“Then there is the permanence problem. Once 
embarrassing information about a person is online, it’s never going to go away. Imagine, thirty years from now, 
some potential employer evaluating a candidate based on a thoughtless remark she made as a teenager. The 
permanence of uploaded information ensures that modern shamings, while obviously milder in severity, can far 
exceed the scope of the scarlet letter, the most extreme manifestation of which was at least branded on the chest, 
where it could be covered.”). 
53
 See Ronson, supra note 50, at 211-13 (discussing the fear for one particular individual subjected to shaming that a 
new employer or friend will find evidence online of her shaming that took place a year earlier). 
54
 See Massaro, supra note 24, at 1916. 
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In the online community, however, little to no interdependence exists and, as a result, little 
incentive exists to forgive and reintegrate the offender.
55
  
 Perhaps more importantly than the lack of societal restraints, online shamings also do not 
have the protections of legal due process. While due process has evolved considerably since 
colonial times, the colonial legal system still protected community members from entirely 
arbitrary shaming punishments.
56
 Internet shamings have no such safeguards.
57
 So then, the 
internet has created a forum for shaming sanctions that are both potentially more severe than 
those in colonial American and not restrained by the social and legal forces present in colonial 
communities. An examination of how social media shamings have operated so far reveals that 
these theoretical concerns have played out in reality.
58
 
 
II. COMMUNITY NORM ENFORCEMENT ON THE INTERNET 
 
 History has shown that community norm enforcement through shaming sanctions has the 
potential to be sufficiently effective to operate as the main method of maintaining social order.
59
 
That the internet has created the conditions for community norm enforcement to again operate 
effectively, but without the legal and social safeguards of the past, raises concerns. Numerous 
examples of social media shamings over the past several years illustrate that community norm 
enforcement on the internet has indeed effected severe results in the lives of perceived offenders 
targeted by shamings. 
 Social media shamings have generally fallen into three categories. First, the internet 
community may initiate a shaming in response to online speech, such as a Tweet or a picture 
posted on Facebook.
60
 Second, the internet community may impose online shaming sanctions in 
response to actions taken offline, actions that may or may not legally constitute a crime.
61
 Third, 
and finally, the internet may react with a shaming to a supposed norm violation that never 
actually occurred.
62
  
 Regardless of which of these forms an online shaming takes, the shaming usually follows 
a common pattern.
63
 Understanding this pattern is essential to effectively regulating internet 
justice without unduly hindering the positive functions that it can perform. Effective regulation 
                                                 
55
 See Ronson, supra note 50, at 306-08 (describing the angry online response the author received after stating 
online that he felt badly for a particular victim of online shaming). 
56
 Although the community could apply shame-based sanctions outside of legal community, these were limited to 
lighter sanctions, such as forced repentance in front of the church congregation, as opposed to sanctions such as the 
stocks or pillories. See Massaro, supra note 24, at 1913. 
57
 Journalists outside the legal community have recognized the dangers of online shamings because of the lack of 
any due process, further evidencing the need for the legal community to respond to internet justice. See Erik Kain, 
Internet Mob Justice Isn’t Justice at All, Forbes (May 14, 2015, 4:51 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/?toURL=https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2015/05/14/internet-mob-
justice-isnt-justice-at-all/&refURL=https://www.google.com/&referrer=https://www.google.com/ (“Sometimes the 
people being shamed are bad people. But always the shaming circumvents due process [and] precedes true justice. . . 
. Innocent until proven guilty doesn't matter at all to the outraged internet.”). 
58
 See infra Part II. 
59
 See supra Part I. 
60
 See infra Subsection II.A.1. 
61
 See infra Subsection II.A.2. 
62
 See infra Subsection II.A.3. 
63
 See infra Subsection II.B. 
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will require pinpointing when in the internet shaming process the primary effect shifts from 
benefit to harm.  
 
A. Archetype Examples of Internet Justice 
 
 1. When the Internet Sanctions Online Speech 
 
 Likely the most common internet shaming scenario is a response to norm-violating 
internet speech. One of the most powerful norms today is the norm against prejudice, particularly 
from a position of privilege. Because prejudice can be expressed through speech as easily as 
through actions, social media operates as a medium where this norm can be both violated and 
enforced.
64
 In one of the most well-known instances of online shaming, Justine Sacco 
experienced first-hand the full force of the internet community’s ability to enforce the norm 
against prejudice.
65
  
 With one Tweet,
 66
 Justice Sacco inadvertently sparked an outrage that illustrates the 
norm enforcement power of the internet community.
67
 Before her Tweet, Sacco worked at an 
internet marketing corporation and had a minimal internet presence with only 170 Twitter 
followers.
68
 Then, while on a trip to Africa, Sacco sent out the following Tweet while waiting in 
the airport: “Going to Africa. Hope I don’t get AIDS. Just kidding. I’m white!”69 When Sacco 
checked her phone before boarding the plane, her Tweet had received no responses.
70
 By the 
time the plane landed eleven hours later, Sacco had become the number one worldwide trending 
topic on Twitter.
71
 
 While on the plane, one of Sacco’s Twitter followers had sent the Tweet to Sam Biddle, a 
writer at Gawker with fifteen thousand Twitter followers.
72
 Biddle shared the Tweet with his 
                                                 
64
 In an interested illustration of this, in late 2014 Slate published an article highlighting an instance of internet 
outrage for every day of 2014. Julia Turner et al., The Year of Outrage, SLATE (Dec. 17, 2014 11:48 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/culturebox/2014/12/the_year_of_outrage_2014_everything_you_were_angry_abo
ut_on_social_media.html. The topics of outrage ranged from environmentalism to politics to international relations. 
See id. Of the 365 instances of outrage highlighted, roughly 112 were responses to perceived prejudice against 
women or racial or ethnic minorities. See id. While Slate has a fairly liberal reputation, see Aaron Blake, Ranking 
the Media from Liberal to Conservative, Based on Their Audiences, WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/10/21/lets-rank-the-media-from-liberal-to-conservative-
based-on-their-audiences/?utm_term=.039c3b181f47, this ratio is still an interesting indication of the importance of 
the norm against prejudice because the article at least attempts to highlight instances of outrage across the spectrum 
of political views.  
65
 The internet community’s self-reflection on Justine Sacco began when the New York Times published an article 
by journalist Jon Ronson detailing Justine’s story of how online shaming drastically affected her life. See Jon 
Ronson, How One Stupid Tweet Blew Up Justine Sacco’s Life, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/magazine/how-one-stupid-tweet-ruined-justine-saccos-life.html. Jon Ronson 
later continued the conversation concerning Justine Sacco and internet shaming in general with his book SO YOU’VE 
BEEN PUBLICLY SHAMED?. See RONSON, supra note 50. 
66
 A Tweet is a message posted by a Twitter user on his or her Twitter page. The user’s followers on Twitter can 
then view the Tweet on their Twitter pages. 
67
 Id.; see also Jon Ronson, When Online Shaming Goes Too Far, TED (June 2015), 
https://www.ted.com/talks/jon_ronson_what_happens_when_online_shaming_spirals_out_of_control#t-285789. 
68
 Ronson, One Stupid Tweet, supra note 65.  
69
 Id.   
70
 Id. 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id.  
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followers and wrote an accompanying piece on Gawker.
73
 Immediately, the internet community 
began to react, sharing the Tweet and writing responses such as “How did @JustineSacco get a 
PR job?! Her level of racist ignorance belongs on Fox News. #AIDS can affect anyone!” and 
“All I want for Christmas is to see @JustineSacco’s face when her plane lands and she checks 
her inbox/voicemail.”74 Twitter users waited anxiously for Sacco to land, and one Twitter user 
even went to the airport to take a photo of Sacco as she arrived at the airport and posted the 
photo on Twitter.
75
 By the time Sacco realized this fallout and deleted both her Tweet and her 
Twitter account, an internet community that stretched across the world had placed Sacco in the 
internet’s equivalent of the community forum and subjected her to a shaming punishment unlike 
anything colonial America could have envisioned.
76
 
 For Sacco, the consequences extended beyond mere embarrassment. Her employer posted 
its disapproval of the Tweet and promptly fired Sacco.
77
 Her family told her that she had 
tarnished the family name.
78
 She ended her vacation early, in part because the workers at the 
hotels where she planned on staying threatened to strike if she arrived.
79
 Several months after the 
initial Tweet, Sacco shared with journalist Ron Jonson that she still experienced shaming from 
the internet community and struggled to engage in activities as normal as dating, for fear her date 
would Google her name.
80
 
 Since Justice Sacco, the internet has continued to effectively use shaming as a tool to 
sanction norm-violating online speech. Online speech, however, is the not the only behavior that 
the internet community can reach through shame-based sanctions. The internet community has 
shown itself effective at sanctioning norm-violating behavior outside the internet as well.   
 
 2. When the Internet Sanctions an Individual’s Actions Outside the Internet  
 
 Although the legal system now punishes most actions that the community categorizes as 
antinormative, the internet community may use shaming to punish actions when the community 
believes that the justice system has failed adequately to do so. In some instances, the internet 
community may utilize shaming when the justice system has applied a punishment not sufficient 
in relation to the action. In other cases, the internet community may use norm enforcement to 
punish actions that the justice system does not recognize or punish as criminal. 
 Brock Turner experienced the ability of the internet community to apply its own set of 
sanctions when the justice system applies a punishment that the community views as inadequate. 
In June of 2016, Turner, a student at Stanford University, was convicted of assaulting an 
unconscious women after a party.
81
 While sexual assault is unfortunately not uncommon, the 
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internet community responded uniquely to this case for at least two reasons. First, at the trial, the 
victim of the assault read an articulate, moving account of her experience since the assault, 
which Buzzfeed published online the next day.
82
 This statement gave words to a growing 
awareness of campus sexual assault and was viewed five million times within the first three days 
after it was published.
83
 Second, the judge in the case sentenced Turner to only six months 
imprisonment, which the internet community found insufficient and unacceptable.
84
  
 In response, the internet community applied shaming sanctions where it perceived that 
the justice system had failed. Individuals on social media Tweeted and posted extensively about 
Turner, and major media responded by publishing innumerable pieces on the case.
85
 Images such 
as those pictured below inundated the internet. 
 
                        
86
      
 
 Three months later, after Turner was released for good behavior, the sanctions applied 
and encouraged by the internet community continued past articles and posts about Turner. 
Protestors gathered outside the jail on the day of Turner’s release in order to speak out against 
                                                 
82
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his early release.
87
 USA Swimming publicly denounced Turner and permanently banned him 
from membership in the organization.
88
 When he returned home, armed protesters gathered 
outside his house carrying signs that carried threatening messages, such as “Castrate All Rapists” 
and “If I Rape Brock Turner Will I Only Do 3 Months?”89 Turner’s case, then, illustrates not 
only the ability of the internet community to apply sanctions when it perceives the formal justice 
system to have failed but also the range of sanctions that the internet community can impose.  
 
3. When the Internet Sanctions an Individual in Response to False Accusations  
 
 Unfortunately, the internet community can also use these powerful tools in response to 
allegations that are later revealed to be mistaken or fabricated. Because anyone can upload a 
statement or photo making an accusation and the internet community can respond almost 
immediately, instances of internet justice based on false or mistaken information are likely 
inevitable. While the ease of internet communication that allows for the spreading of false 
accusations can also facilitate the communication of the truth, the accused individuals may still 
suffer the consequences of sanctions imposed before the truth comes to light.   
 The case of the “Darth Vader Selfie Dad” illustrates the ability of the internet community 
to quickly spread both false accusations and corrections.
90
 In 2015, a woman at a mall in 
Australia took a picture of a stranger whom she thought had just taken a picture of her children.
91
 
After telling security, who contacted the police, the woman posted the picture of the man on 
Facebook, along with the warning “Ok people, take a look at this creep . . . [B]e safe with your 
kids.”92 In reality, the man had not taken pictures of her children but had only taken a selfie in 
front of a Darth Vader cut-out to send to his children.
93
 Soon, the post had been shared over 
20,000 times, and the man began receiving death threats.
94
 As soon as the man learned of the 
post, he contacted the police to explain what had really happened.
95
  
 Because of how widely circulated the original post had been, the revelation of the actual 
story also spread quickly. The Daily Mail of Australia published the man’s story, and the woman 
apologized publicly and expressed her regret over sharing the post.
96
 Despite the public 
recognition of his innocence, the accused man expressed the devastating effect of the shaming on 
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him and his children.
97
 Thus, while the internet community can correct itself when it shames 
someone based on false or mistaken information, the shaming sanctions can still have a severe 
effect on the accused individual. 
 
B. The Lifecycle of Internet Justice 
 
 Understanding the power of internet justice to impose effective sanctions, even in 
response to false accusations, highlights the need to understand the phenomenon and formulate 
an effective solution. Crafting such a solution requires understanding where in the lifecycle of 
internet justice the primary effect changes from norm enforcement, typically a positive social 
function, to danger to the individual, a negative social result. An examination of the standard 
stages of internet justice will help determine where in the process the law should step in and 
regulate. 
  
 1. Initial Recognition 
 
 Internet justice typically begins with initial recognition of an antinormative act by an 
publisher with an established internet following. For example, Justine Sacco’s shaming began 
after Gawker editor Sam Biddle published an article highlighting Sacco’s tweet.98 Similarly, the 
internet community targeted Brock Turner after BuzzFeed published the witness statement from 
the victim that retold her experiences after the sexual assault.
99
 In both these instances, the 
antinormative behavior would have likely never come to the public’s attention without the initial 
recognition by an online publisher. 
 
 2. Mutually Reinforcing Publicity  
 
 After the initial recognition by an online publisher, the antinormative action typically 
gains widespread exposure through mutually reinforcing publicity between private individuals 
and major media sources. This begins with extensive sharing of the initial article that highlighted 
the antinormative behavior. Once the article becomes popular to certain extent, major media 
begins publishing articles discussing the popularity of the topic, including a discussion of the 
original action that caused the uproar.
100
 These major media articles serve to further extend the 
widespread recognition of the offense.  
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 3. Online Shaming 
 
 Simultaneously with the growing recognition of the offense begins the shaming of the 
targeted individual. Shaming partially consists of simply spreading the publicity of the offense 
by sharing articles discussing the offense, but it also includes statements made by individual 
social media users discussing the offense and criticizing the offender. The shaming can also 
incorporate mediums other than writtenposts, such as the images used to label Brock Turner as a 
rapist.
101
 Once the shaming reaches its peak, the ultimate goal becomes “effect[ing] the ritual 
destruction of the person denounced.”102 Before the targeted individual experiences any tangible 
consequences of internet justice, then, the individual suffers the reconstitution of their identity 
into an offender.   
 
 4. Consequences for the Individual 
 
 In most cases, the targeted individual does experience real-life consequences as well. 
Justine Sacco lost her job almost immediately as a result of the internet justice response to her 
antinormative speech, and she was forced to cancel her trip because of safety concerns and 
employee boycotts at the hotels on her itinerary.
103
 Similarly, Brock Turner permanently lost his 
membership of USA Swimming soon after being targeted by internet justice.
104
 As internet 
justice progresses, then, it applies tangible sanctions on those targeted beyond simply labeling 
the individual as an offender. 
 
 5. Learning the Physical Location of the Individual 
 
 Internet justice grows more dangerous as the internet community learns the physical 
location of the targeted individual. In some cases, the targeted individual’s general location may 
be obvious from the beginning, such as the widely publicized fact that Justine Sacco was on a 
plane to Africa while she was being shamed online.
105
 In other cases, however, members of the 
internet community may intentionally seek out and publicize the targeted individual’s address or 
phone number.
106
 Additionally, members of the internet community may seek to determine the 
exact location of the targeted individual, utilizing methods similar to stalking.
107
 Although 
learning the physical location of the targeted individual may occur simultaneously with the rest 
of the shaming, it adds an important layer to the sanctions, and potential danger, placed upon the 
individual. 
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 6. Physical Danger to the Individual 
 
 Although learning the physical location of the targeted individual does not always signify 
danger to the individual, it allows physical safety to become a legitimate concern. If the location 
of the victim is known, then violent and threatening posts or messages demand careful 
consideration because a member of the internet community could conceivably respond by 
carrying out the advocated-for violence. Indeed, one of the main reasons Justice Sacco was 
forced to abandon her trip in Africa was the fact that local officials could not guarantee her 
safety.
108
 Similarly, although Brock Turner did not experience actual violence, he was placed in 
fear of violence by the armed protestors who surrounded his house.
109
  
 Internet justice may not always follow this progression exactly, but analyzing separately 
each aspect of internet justice assists in determining how to appropriately regulate it. The legal 
community’s response to internet justice should regulate internet justice without impeding the 
positive role that internet justice can play. In light of the stages in the lifecycle of internet justice, 
regulation of internet justice should operate to remove fear of physical danger for the targeted 
individual to the extent possible. The legal solution can accomplish this by removing threatening 
and stalking material that places the individual in fear of harm. Before formulating such a 
regulatory solution, however, the legal community must consider whether internet justice should 
be allowed to exist at all. 
 
III. HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM BENEFITS FROM INTERNET JUSTICE 
 
 Looking at the examples of internet justice explored in the previous section, one could 
easily determine that online shaming should have no place in society. Shamings on social media 
are effective in ways beyond what was possible in the past, while at the same time more 
unhindered than at any point in history. Examples of internet shaming confirm that social media 
indeed can apply sanctions that are either too severe or unwarranted entirely. Taking these 
factors into consideration, some may conclude that the legal community should respond to 
internet justice by limiting it to greatest extent possible. Despite the concerns raised by internet 
justice, however, it can also play a significant, complementary role to the formal justice system 
that the legal community should recognize in formulating a response to internet justices. 
 
A. Why Recognize Any Benefits to Internet Justice? 
 
 Several authors have discussed the dangers of both social media shamings and shaming 
sanctions generally. Dan Markel, in Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive?, argues 
that shaming sanctions are dangerous, in part because they bear more commonalities to revenge 
than to retribution.
110
 First, Markel draws attention to “the potentially unconstrained scope and 
intensity of shaming punishments,” closer to lynch mobs than to justly retributive punishment.111 
                                                 
108
 See id. 
109
 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
110
 Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the 
Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2216-22 (2001). In his article, Markel focuses on the use of 
shaming sanctions by the formal legal system, however, because his arguments focus on the dangers of community 
shaming punishments generally, his points are relevant as well to internet shaming sanctions outside the formal legal 
system. See id. 
111
 See id. at 2217. 
16 
 
Second, Markel argues that shame-based punishments improperly place authority to punish into 
the hands of the public, thus denying the judiciary its proper role as the sole arbiter of 
punishment.
112
 Finally, Markel looks to the effect of shaming punishments on both the offenders 
and the punishers. Shaming punishments dehumanize both the offender and the punishers as the 
community participates in stripping away the dignity of the offender.
113
  
 Similarly, discussing social media shaming specifically, Kate Klonick compares 
shamings to typical, state-enforced sanctions and concludes that, unlike state-enforced sanctions, 
social media shamings are indeterminate, uncalibrated, and inaccurate.
114
 Klonick explains that 
acts usually included in online shaming, such as re-Tweeting a photo of the offender, have 
indeterminate social meaning because the act could be motivated by a desire to reinforce a social 
norm or, alternatively, by boredom or even sadism.
115
 As noted by Markel, shamings are also 
uncalibrated because no governmental body restrains the punishments inflicted by the 
community.
116
 But Klonick points out that social media shamings amplify this concern because 
the internet allows for the community to impose shamings punishments much more easily than 
communities in the past.
117
 Finally, Klonick expresses the concern that social media shamings 
are often inaccurate, as illustrated by multiple examples of social media shamings that were 
triggered by a mistake or a lie.
118
  
Despite these arguments illustrating the dangers of shaming, there are several reasons 
why the legal community can and should recognize the positive role that social media shamings 
can play. First, as discussed earlier, community norm enforcement through shame-based 
sanctions has played a healthy and effective role in society in the past.
119
 Viewed through the 
lens of this history, while the internet opens the door for new dangers associated with online 
shamings, it also creates a new opportunity for shamings to play a unique and beneficial role in 
society.  
Second, because the legal system cannot realistically end online shaming entirely,
120
 a 
response to internet justice from the legal community should recognize the potential positive 
roles that online shaming can play. Because speech is the principal tool of internet justice, the 
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First Amendment prevents the legal community from altogether eliminating internet justice.
121
 In 
light of this, recognizing the benefits of internet justice will allow the legal community to craft a 
solution that will regulate internet justice without hindering its beneficial aspects.  
Third, and most importantly, the legal community should recognize the value of internet 
justice because internet justice has recognizable potential to play a significant role 
complementary to the formal legal system. Two examples will illustrate the ways that internet 
justice can play an important role in complementing the formal legal system.
122
 
 
B. The Complementary Role of Internet Justice 
 
 Most significantly, internet justice can complement the formal legal system by 
conscripting antinormative behavior that law enforcement cannot or will not punish. Informal 
norm enforcement operates to sanction behavior that the community recognizes as negative, but 
that the formal justice system does not reach, either because of constitutional limitations or 
because of societal consensus that legal liability is not appropriate.
123
 As an enhanced form of 
norm enforcement, internet justice can allow a large, yet cohesive community to effectively 
express condemnation of and sanction negative behavior on a scale not before possible. Two 
areas of potential positive applications of internet justice are antinormative speech and unethical 
business practices.  
 
 1. Repugnant Speech 
 
 Internet justice presents a potential solution to the tension between the desire to protect 
speech from governmental regulation and the societal disapproval of speech that is harmful or 
offensive.
124
 Although the First Amendment allows for regulation of some speech that involves a 
threat to another or spreads false accusations against another, the First Amendment prohibits the 
government from punishing speech solely because of its offensive nature.
125
 Through internet 
justice, however, the internet community can express disapproval of repugnant speech and apply 
sanctions to deter it. Although the sanctions applied by the internet community may not always 
be proportionate to the offense, such as was arguably the case with Justice Sacco, internet justice 
has the potential to accomplish the good of reducing hateful speech, while avoiding the evil of 
governmental regulation of speech.
126
 
 
                                                 
121
 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
122
 See infra Section III.B. 
123
 See generally Ellickson, supra note 9, at 4-6. 
124
 See generally Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (“[A] State is, ordinarily, denied the power to 
prohibit dissemination of social, economic and political doctrine which a vast majority of its citizens believes to be 
false and fraught with evil consequence.”). 
125
 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-59 (2003). 
126
 There are some indications that the internet community is beginning to self-regulate the degree of punishment 
imposed on antinormative speech. For example, a year after Justice Sacco’s shaming, Sam Biddle, the Gawker 
editor who initially brought attention to Sacco’s Tweet, published a piece recognizing the “incredibly 
disproportionate” punishment that Sacco received. See Sam Biddle, Justine Sacco Is Good at Her Job, and How I 
Came to Peace with Her, GAWKER (Dec. 20, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://gawker.com/justine-sacco-is-good-at-her-job-
and-how-i-came-to-pea-1653022326.   
18 
 
 2. Ethical Business Practice 
 
 Another difficult area for the law to regulate that internet justice could address is 
sanctioning unethical business practices. For some forms of unethical business practices, the law 
may impose liability, such as knowingly utilizing forced labor in a company’s supply chain.127 
Investigation and prosecution is difficult in these cases, however, and will likely only succeed in 
the most unambiguous cases and, even when successful, may not succeed in deterring corporate 
behavior.
128
 Other business practices, such as poor working conditions or wages for workers 
overseas, may not implicate legal liability at all but may still be considered unethical by 
members of society.     
 Through internet justice, the internet community can sanction both forms of unethical 
business practices when the law cannot. The internet provides both the tools to learn about a 
business’s practices129 and the platform to call attention to and sanction businesses that violate 
ethical norms. Because online shaming focuses on assigning the label of “offender” to the target 
of the shaming, online shaming can be especially effective in deterring negative business 
practices, as businesses spend billions each year to maintain positive name recognition among 
consumers.
130
 In addition, the internet community can impose further sanctions beyond shaming, 
such as coordinating consumer boycotts of offending companies.
131
 Through these tools, the 
internet community can complement the formal legal system by holding publicly accountable 
companies that engage in unethical practices that the law does not reach.  
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IV. REGULATING INTERNET JUSTICE 
 
 Having established that internet justice has the potential to play a beneficial, 
complementary role to the formal legal system, the next step for a holistic response from the 
legal community is establishing a solution to the dangers of internet justice. As discussed above, 
the solution should focus on how to limit online shaming when it progresses beyond harassment 
and begins approaching cyberstalking. Potential solutions exists in private action,
132
 tort law,
133
 
and in criminal statutes.
134
 Each of these solutions, however, has significant limitations and 
cannot be relied upon as a comprehensive solution to internet justice. While not a simple 
solution, the most effective solution for protecting against the dangers of internet justice is a 
regulatory scheme that places responsibility on website operators for removing threatening 
material from their webpages.
135
   
 
A. The Range of Potential Solutions  
 
 1. Private Action 
 
 Private action responses to social media shamings can take at least three different forms. 
First, victims of an unjustified online shaming can make an appeal to the internet community to 
“clear their names” and end the shaming.136 This approach has had some limited success in the 
past in cases where a shaming was based upon mistaken or false information.
137
 Appeals from a 
target of online shaming will not always succeed, however. And even when they do succeed, the 
process for the victim may be long and painful.
138
 As a result, this solution is not ideal.  
Second, those with an influential voice in the internet community can appeal to the 
community to change shaming patterns. Numerous authors and journalists have made such 
appeals, seeking to persuade the internet community to stop online shamings, or at least to learn 
more of the facts before engaging in online shaming.
139
 These calls for reform, however, can 
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send conflicting messages, which may detract from their effectiveness.
140
 In addition, based upon 
the continued prevalence of online shaming, these calls to action have not fully accomplished 
their goal.    
Third, influential corporations connected to social media can develop solutions to 
identifying and eliminating online shaming that devolves into harassment. Google has led in this 
area. Through a subsidiary named Jigsaw, Google has been developing an algorithm to detect 
and censor harassment online.
141
 Jigsaw has designed the algorithm, named Conversation AI, to 
recognize language that a human moderator would label harassment.
142
 Already, companies such 
as The New York Times and the Wikimedia Foundation have partnered with Jigsaw to test 
Conversation AI in the comments sections of their websites, with some success.
143
 
While technology-driven solutions like this are promising, they also raise concerns. On 
one hand, the technology is not perfect at recognizing harassing language.
144
 On the other hand, 
if the technology becomes too effective, it may censor too much content, thus hindering political 
speech on the internet.
145
 Finally, even if the algorithm works perfectly to identify harassment, 
websites still have no obligation to use the algorithm. 
Ultimately, while private action solutions are promising and should be encouraged by the 
legal community, they are not solutions that can be effected by the legal system. The legal 
system plays an important role in applying coercive force to parties who refuse to change their 
conduct in response to private appeals or to utilize technological solutions. As a result, a holistic 
response from the legal community should include a proposed legal solution. 
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 2. Solutions from Tort Law 
 
 Private law presents a potential solution to some aspects of internet justice. Three areas of 
tort law could potentially assist in preventing social media shamings from devolving into 
cyberstalking by giving targeted individuals recourse against those who posted threatening 
material online. Although each of these could potentially provide a remedy, however, tort law is 
an inadequate tool for regulating internet justice.   
 
a. Defamation 
 
Defamation could provide a remedy to some individuals targeted by harmful forms of 
internet justice, particularly those individuals targeted based solely on false accusations. To 
prevail in an action for defamation, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) made a false and 
damaging statement, (2) distributed the statement to a third party, (3) acted at least negligently in 
doing so, and (4) caused harm to the plaintiff.
146
 Importantly, in many of jurisdictions, a plaintiff 
can hold the defendant liable for special harm caused by the repetition of the defamatory 
statement by third-parties if the defendant intended the repetition or should have reasonably 
expected it.
147
 In conducting this analysis, courts generally take into account “if the originator 
has himself widely disseminated the defamation . . . in determining whether there were grounds 
to expect the further dissemination of the slander.”148 As a result, an individual targeted by 
harmful internet justice can likely recover for harm caused not only by an original statement 
online, but also for harm caused by the widespread sharing of the statement. 
The availability of defamation, however, will be limited by the requirement that the 
defamatory statement be false.
149
 Because of this requirement, an individual such as Justine 
Sacco would not be able to recover under defamation for harmful or dangerous statements 
leveled against her in relation to true accusations based on her tweet.
150
 A individuals falsely 
accused and shamed, however, such as the Darth Vader Selfie Dad, may have a cause of action 
under defamation to recover damages for harm caused by the false statement and its widespread 
circulation. Defamation, then, could provide a remedy to the subset of individuals targeted by 
internet justice who experienced shaming sanctions based on false information, but not to those 
who received threats based on true accusations. 
 
b. IIED 
 
Individuals targeted by internet justice that crosses the threshold from primarily 
beneficial to primarily dangerous could also potentially find success in tort actions for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Under the doctrine of IIED, “[a]n actor who by extreme 
and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional harm to another is 
subject to liability for that emotional harm and, if the emotional harm causes bodily harm, also 
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for the bodily harm.”151 “Extreme and outrageous conduct” sets a high bar that requires conduct 
which “goes beyond the bounds of human decency such that it would be regarded as intolerable 
in a civilized community.”152 In addition, the emotional harm suffered must be serious in order 
for IIED to provide a remedy.
153
 As a result, a plaintiff seeking damages under a theory of IIED 
faces a heavy burden. 
In cases where internet justice leads to instances of location sharing and threats, however, 
targeted individuals may have successful claims for IIED. For example, in Delfino v. Agilent 
Technologies Inc., the California Court of Appeals held that repeated graphic threats of violence 
on an internet messaging board could fulfill the “extreme and outrageous” element of IIED.154 
Similarly, in Kleopfel v. Bokor the Court of Appeals of Washington held that stalking and threats 
constituted “extreme and outrageous conduct.”155 When internet justice begins to incorporate 
stalking and violent threats, then, the targeted individuals may find success in bringing claims for 
IIED.
156
 
 
c. Privacy Torts157 
 
Finally, in some instances of harmful internet justice, the privacy torts may provide a 
remedy for targeted individuals. The privacy torts include (1) intrusion, (2) appropriation of 
another’s name or likeness, (3) publicity given to another’s private life, and (4) false light 
portrayal.
158
 As with defamation, the tort of false light portrayal may provide a remedy where an 
individual is shamed based on false information.
159
 Additionally, in some cases of internet justice 
that cross the threshold into cyberstalking, the torts of intrusion and publicity may provide a 
remedy. Intrusion involves the unwanted prying into the private life of another, such as taking 
photos of the inside of another’s house or continual harassment through phone calls.160 Publicity 
given to private life, on the other hand, involves the offensive publication of a private matter that 
is not of legitimate concern to the public.
161
 Intrusion and publicity given to private life may give 
plaintiffs a remedy who experience stalking, such as photos taken of them in the privacy of their 
home or possibly repeated harassing messages online, as a result of internet justice. The 
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availability of this remedy, however, will be limited by the requirement that the conduct be 
“highly offensive” and intrude upon an area that the plaintiff has made private, such the interior 
of the home.
162
  
Although each of these areas of tort law may provide a remedy to targets of harmful 
internet justice, tort law remedies are not an ideal solution to controlling internet justice for 
several reasons. First, the costs of trial, both civil and financial, will likely be prohibitive for 
many potential plaintiffs, especially when relief is uncertain because of the novelty of the 
claims.
163
 Second, because internet justice is a group effort, selecting a particular defendant may 
be a difficult or impossible task, especially when many of the group participants may be 
anonymous users of an online forum.
164
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly to those targeted 
by internet justice, seeking a legal judgment against individuals will likely serve to exacerbate 
the shaming they are already experiencing online. Consider, for example, if Brock Turner had 
brought suit against the armed protesters outside his house for IIED. While a few members of the 
internet community may have supported a lawsuit, the majority of the internet community would 
likely respond with reinvigorated contempt and shaming. For this reason, in addition to the other 
difficulties associated with bringing tort actions, tort law does not provide an adequate solution 
to regulating internet justice. 
 
 3. Statutory Solutions 
 
 Finally, criminal law provides a third potential solution to protecting against the dangers 
of internet justice. The U.S. Code already has a provision, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), that prohibits the 
interstate communication of a threat.
165
 Because the solution to regulating internet justice should 
aim to remove threatening material that creates danger for the targeted individual, § 875(c) 
facially appears to be an ideal remedy. Under § 875(c), or equivalent state statutes, individuals 
who post threats or calls to violence against targets of internet justice could face criminal 
liability, the strongest possible deterrence against posting violent material.
166
 
 Relying upon a criminal statute, however, also has several disadvantages that make it a 
poor solution to controlling internet justice. Most significantly, criminal law requires reliance 
upon law enforcement officials to identify and respond to threatening online material. Law 
enforcement may have neither the training necessary to recognize online threats nor the 
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resources to investigate every potential case.
167
 If law enforcement chooses not to respond, then 
the targeted individual is left exposed to danger. Additionally, identifying the perpetrators in 
such cases may be difficult, requiring investigative efforts to determine the individuals behind 
anonymous usernames and further disincentivising involvement by law enforcement. Because of 
the necessity and difficulty of securing law enforcement involvement, criminal law does not 
provide a reliable solution to protecting individuals against the potential harms of internet justice.   
 
B. Suggestions for a Regulatory Solution 
 
 To holistically protect against the dangers of internet justice, while not hindering the 
beneficial role of online community norm enforcement, Congress should utilize regulatory law to 
craft a solution to internet justice. Through regulatory law, an agency can place responsibility for 
the removal of threatening material directly on website operators, thus removing the requirement 
that the targeted individual bring suit against anonymous internet users to find relief through tort 
law. Additionally, under an administrative scheme, the responsibility for imposing liability 
would rest with the agency, a body typically equipped with greater expertise in the area than law 
enforcement. Because regulatory law avoids the difficulty of placing responsibility on either the 
targeted individual to bring suit or law enforcement to prosecute, an administrative solution 
would best protect targeted individuals against the dangers of internet justice.  
To accomplish this solution, Congress should enact a statute giving the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) authority to promulgate regulations for when internet 
service providers must remove cyberstalking material. In order to give this authority to the FCC, 
however, Congress must first amend the Communication Decency Act, which has already come 
under severe criticism for not evolving in tandem with the rapidly changing internet landscape. 
Additionally, because Congress will be granting the FCC authority to regulate online speech, the 
statute will need to comply with the requirements of the First Amendment, which is possible 
under the True Threat doctrine elucidated in United States v. Watts and in Virginia v. Black. 
Having passed through these hurdles, Congress will be able to authorize the FCC to promulgate 
rules for internet service providers to follow regarding when cyberstalking material must be 
removed.  
  
 1. Amending the Communications Decency Act  
 
 Before Congress can give any agency authority to impose requirements on internet 
service providers regarding content published by third-parties, Congress first must amend § 
230(c) of the Communications Decency Act (CDA).
168
 Section 230(c)(1) currently protects 
internet service providers (ISPs) from liability for content posted by third-parties.
169
 It does so by 
directing that ISPs cannot be treated as publishers of content posted by a third party.
170
 As non-
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publishers, ISPs cannot face publisher liability for offensive or illegal content posted on their 
websites.
171
 
Ironically, Congress originally intended the CDA to protect internet service providers 
from liability for good faith attempts to remove harassing or offensive content.
172
 Indeed, § 
230(c) is entitled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material” 
and § 230(c)(2) protects ISPs from liability for removal of content that the ISP deems offensive, 
violent, or harassing.
173
 Instead of encouraging proactive removal of offensive content, however, 
the statute has primarily operated to protect the continued publication of harassing or harmful 
content online because internet service providers cannot face liability for any material posted on 
their websites.
174
 Numerous authors have advocated for an amendment to the Communications 
Decency Act in light of this unintended consequence.
175
 
 Congress should now revise the CDA to allow ISPs to face publisher liability in certain 
circumstances. Elimination of § 230(c)(1), removing all protection from liability for content 
posted by third-parties, would likely be too drastic a revision, both in terms of its abruptness and 
its breadth. Instead, Congress should amend the CDA by including a provision giving the FCC 
authority to enact regulations determining when an ISP may be held liable as a publisher of third-
party content. Determining the appropriate rules for the FCC to enact to protect against 
dangerous forms of internet justice first requires an examination of the First Amendment. 
 
 2. True Threat as a First Amendment Exception for Cyberstalking-Related Speech 
 
 Even if Congress were to amend the Communications Decency Act to allow for the 
regulation of internet service providers, Congress would still need to navigate the First 
Amendment in crafting a statute that would require the removal of cyberstalking speech online. 
As Supreme Court has repeatedly held, the First Amendment does not prohibit all regulation of 
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speech.
176
 Instead, the First Amendment allows for the prohibition of certain categories of speech 
that are “of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from 
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”177 These proscribable 
categories  include speech designed to cause an immediate breach of the peace,
178
 defamation,
179
 
and intimidation.
180
 For the purpose of regulating speech related to cyberstalking, the most 
relevant category of proscribable speech is true threat, first recognized in Watts v. United States. 
 In Watts, the Supreme Court first recognized that the government may prohibit and 
punish speech intended to communicate a threat.
181
 Since Watts, the Court has refined the 
elements of what constitutes a true threat. Under the current true threat doctrine, a true threat is a 
statement that “the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an 
act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”182 Whether a 
statement constitutes a true threat does not depend on the speaker’s intent to carry out the threat 
but upon the speaker’s intent to place the subject of the threat in fear of bodily harm.183 The 
purpose of the true threat doctrine is to protect individuals from the fear of violence.
184
 
 Recently, in Elonis v. United States, the Supreme Court implicitly accepted that violent 
internet posts could fall under the true threat exception.
185
 In Elonis, the government brought 
charges under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which prohibits the interstate communication of threats.
186
 
Elonis had posted online violent writings, discussing acts of violence against his wife and against 
police.
187
 These posts were not sent, or even addressed, directly to the subjects of his violent 
statements.
188
 The Supreme Court ultimately reversed Elonis’s conviction based upon a holding 
that the lower court had incorrectly interpreted the mens rea requirement of § 875(c).
189
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However, neither the parties nor the Court argued that Elonis’s conviction raised First 
Amendment issues based upon the statements not constituting true threats, indicating that online 
posts advocating violence, such as those in this case, can constitute true threats. 
 Because the goal of cyberstalking is to place the target in fear of harm, a regulatory rule 
requiring the removal of cyberstalking speech would fall under the true threat doctrine. Examples 
of cyberstalking speech that could constitute a true threat include: a picture posted online of a 
targeted individual with a caption calling for violence against that individual, a message sent 
directly to a targeted individual threatening violence, or a post sharing the address of a targeted 
individual with the intent to place the individual in fear of violence. Because true threat does not 
require intent to actually carry out the violence, these statements still constitute true threats, even 
if the individual making the statements is unable to actually carry them out. Furthermore, these 
statements can create a reasonable fear of actual violence for the targeted individual because the 
call to violence is widely visible to those who can carry out violence against the targeted 
individual. As a result, under the true threat doctrine, Congress could enact a statute requiring the 
FCC to promulgate rules requiring the removal cyberstalking speech that passes scrutiny under 
the First Amendment. The last step, then, is crafting regulations that would remain within the 
strictures of the true threat doctrine and would reasonably and effectively require internet service 
providers to remove cyberstalking material.
190
 
 
 3. Suggested Rules for Internet Service Providers  
 
 To accomplish the goal of protecting individuals from dangerous forms of internet justice 
while staying the within the strictures of the First Amendment, the regulations enacted by the 
FCC should utilize a notice-removal requirement and provide guidelines for when an online post 
constitutes a true threat. Liability for internet service providers for illegal speech of which they 
have notice is not an original proposition. Legal scholars have suggested a notice-removal 
scheme for regulating other harmful forms of internet speech, such cyberbullying or 
defamation.
191
 Additionally, Congress has already utilized a notice-removal requirement under 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA) to prevent copyright violations.
192
 
 Under the DMCA, certain website operators are liable for copyright infringement when 
they are put on notice of the infringement by the copyright holder.
193
 The DMCA requires 
operators of websites that allow for the public uploading and access of content to designate on 
the website a contact-person for complaints of copyright infringement.
194
 To effectively put a 
website operator on notice of copyright infringement, the copyright holder must follow specific 
requirements, such identifying the infringing material and providing a statement that the 
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complainant has a good faith belief that the material infringes a copyright.
195
 If, after receiving 
notice, the website operator fails to remove the infringing material, the copyright holder can 
bring suit against the website operator.
196
 
  Similarly, a notice-removal rule could impose liability on website operators who are put 
on notice of threatening or stalking material uploaded to their websites. The notice-removal rule 
for threatening material, however, should be different from the DMCA notice-removal 
requirement in two respects. First, the rule for removal of threatening material should utilize a 
less stringent notice requirement than the DCMA. Under the DCMA, the class of individuals 
with knowledge of the copyright infringement is limited to the copyright holders themselves. In 
contrast, any individual can identify a post that calls for violence against a specific individual. 
Allowing anyone to file a notification of a threatening post could accomplish the removal of 
dangerous posts that a targeted individual may not have yet seen but that still place the individual 
in danger. Similar to the DMCA, then, notice should require specific identification of the 
threatening material, along with a description of why the post constitutes a threat. Notice, 
however, should not require complaints to identify themselves as the subjects of the threatening 
material. 
Second, the remedy for violation of the notice-removal requirement should be a fine 
imposed by the FCC, rather than civil liability. Requiring the targeted individual to bring suit to 
impose liability on the website operator would raise the same concerns as reliance upon tort 
law—the high cost of bringing suit and the exacerbation of the targeted individual’s shaming. 
Instead, the FCC should impose fines upon website operators who fail to comply with the notice-
removal requirement.  
To determine whether website operators are complying with the requirement, the FCC 
could utilize both a private complaint procedure and a requirement that website operators issue a 
report of their procedures for receiving and responding to notifications. For websites operators 
that in good faith attempt to respond to notifications, but consistently fail to recognize and take 
down posts that constitute true threats, the FCC could issue opinion letter to urge better practices. 
Conversely, for website operators who do not make a good faith attempt to respond to 
notifications, the FCC should impose coercive penalties, such as fines. In this way, encouraging 
the removal of threatening material does not require lengthy litigation that would often yield only 
a small amount of damages.  
To assist website operators in identifying material that requires removal, the FCC should 
issue guidelines for when online material constitutes a true threat. These guidelines could list a 
number of factors, such as whether the post identifies an individual by name, shares the location 
of the individual, or advocates violence. The guidelines could also include context-based 
indicators for when a post may or may not constitute a true threat that requires removal under the 
rule. These guidelines would both assist website operators in removing dangerous material and 
provide the FCC with a benchmark for whether websites are complying substantially with the 
notice-removal requirement of the rule. 
   Some may argue that a rule requiring removal of material determined by website 
operators to be a true threat may chill the free speech rights of internet users. A subset of legal 
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scholars have criticized the notice-removal provision of the DCMA for this reason.
197
 The 
notice-removal rule should not raise concerns for the chilling of speech for several reasons. First, 
a requirement placed upon the website operator to remove threatening speech does chill the 
speech of internet users because it does not subject internet users to liability for their speech. 
While the notice-removal requirement may result in the removal of some material, it will not 
place individual internet users in danger of liability. Second, under the CDA, website operators 
are already encouraged to remove harassing or offensive speech by having a shield from liability 
for removal of such speech.
198
 Finally, a notice-removal requirement for threatening speech 
raises even less of a free speech concern than the DMCA because it is focused solely on low-
value speech. While the DMCA requires removal of material that could be of social or political 
value aside from the copyright infringement, the notice-removal requirement proposed here 
would focus solely on the removal of threatening material. Even if a website removes material 
that does not constitute a true threat under Supreme Court precedent, it will still be removing low 
value speech that should not raise the same level of free speech concerns as the DMCA may 
raise. For these reasons, concerns of chilling online speech should not dissuade Congress and the 
FCC from the use of a notice-removal rule to require the deletion of true threats. 
  
CONCLUSION 
   
 Internet justice is a new phenomenon with significant repercussions for the legal 
community. While shame-based community norm enforcement played an important role in tribal 
and colonial communities, the modern criminal justice system has abandoned community 
shaming punishments for exclusively government-imposed incarceration. The internet, however, 
has allowed shamed-based community norm enforcement to again emerge as a significant force 
in sanctioning antinormative behavior, in many ways even more effectively than was possible in 
the past. Because of the potential for internet justice to both cause substantial harm to individuals 
and complement the legal system in positive ways, internet justice requires a holistic response 
from the legal community. Through a notice-removal rule that requires website operators to take 
down threatening online speech that places targeted individuals in danger, the legal community 
can limit the potential dangers of internet justice while also allowing internet justice to fulfill its 
complementary role. Alternatively, by failing to respond to internet justice, the legal community 
will lose the opportunity to guide internet justice in fulfilling its potentially significant roles and 
to protect targeted individuals from its potential harms. 
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